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Abstract
We document changes in New Zealand corporate board characteristics between 1995
and 2010, a period centred around the 2003 governance-focused reforms of NZX list-
ing rules and recommendations. Unsurprisingly, the representation of non-executive,
independent and female directors on NZ boards rose during the period, as did real
chair and director fees and the importance of board committees, while average board
size fell. Perhaps more surprisingly, much of this movement occurred before 2003.
Moreover, there are some intriguing differences between New Zealand and other,
mainly larger, countries. We use this information to identify a number of unan-
swered questions about New Zealand corporate boards.
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1 Introduction
Over the last 25 years, the role of corporate governance has been extensively discussed
and examined by researchers, journalists, corporate officers, regulators and politicians. As
a result of this focus, many countries — including Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK) and the
United States (US) — have adopted guidelines or codes that are intended to encourage or
require firms to adopt so-called ‘best-practice’ models of corporate governance.1
Underpinning this legislative activity is a voluminous amount of academic research:
Adams et al. (2010), Becht et al. (2003), Clarke (2007), Gillan (2006) and Leblanc and
Gillies (2005) provide excellent summaries of the various strands of the international lit-
erature. In New Zealand (NZ), governance research has focused almost exclusively on a
subset of what Gillan calls ‘internal governance’: the role and activities of the board of
directors. For example, many authors attempt to determine the importance of a limited
number of board characteristics (usually board size and the prevalence of outside direc-
tors) for NZ firm performance, e.g., Chin et al. (2004), Elayan et al. (2003), Hossain et al.
(2001), Prevost et al. (2002), Reddy et al. (2008), and Reddy et al. (2010). Others exam-
ine the relationship between board characteristics and (i) executive compensation (e.g.,
Andjelkovic et al., 2002; Hurst and Vos, 2009; Jiang et al., 2009) or (ii) firm derivatives us-
age (Marsden and Prevost, 2005) or (iii) financial reporting quality (Bradbury et al, 2006;
Rainsbury et al., 2009).2 A much smaller body of work investigates the determinants of
the board characteristics themselves. For example, Mak and Roush (2000) use 1980s IPO
data to investigate systematic variation in board size, outside director representation, and
CEO duality, while Cahan and Wilkinson (1999), Prevost et al. (2003) and Hossain et al.
(2000) focus on issues associated with outside director representation. Similarly, Bradbury
(1990), Goodwin (2003), Rainsbury (2004) and Rainsbury et al. (2008) document various
aspects of audit committee makeup.
1The New Zealand Corporate Governance Best Practice Code, together with several governance-related
amendments to listing rules, was developed and released by the stock exchange (NZX) in 2003. Both the
Code and the revised listing rules became fully effective in 2004. Although the listing rules are mandatory
for all firms listing on NZX – unless an exemption is obtained – the Best Practice Code is aspirational.
Similar principles were adopted (in 2004) by the New Zealand Securities Commission as a set of guidelines
for all NZ companies.
2In addition, Cahan et al. (2005) investigate the relationship between board structure and CEO pay
in state-owned enterprises.
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In all of these studies, information on NZ boards is essentially treated as a means
to an end – either as a set of exogenous variables potentially explaining outcomes of
interest such as firm performance or executive compensation, or as endogenous variables
whose within-NZ variation is to be explained – rather than being of intrinsic interest.3
Moreover, these studies are necessarily limited in scope: information is provided about
only a very small number of board characteristics, different authors use different definitions
or measurements of these variables, and the sample periods tend to be concentrated in
the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, we have only a very rough idea of the overall state and
evolution of NZ boards – what one might call the ‘stylised facts’ of NZ internal governance.
In this paper, we seek to fill this gap by documenting the composition, activity and
incentives of NZ boards during the 16-year period encompassing 1995 to 2010. We exam-
ine the extent to which these features have changed over time, how both their levels and
trends compare with other countries, and their relationship with firm size. Such a task is
potentially important as virtually all existing research on board structure focuses on firms
from large economies, particularly the US and UK. By contrast, relatively little is known
about the internal governance of firms in small, open economies; although Institutional
Shareholder Services provide a comprehensive comparison of governance attributes, their
coverage is limited to globally-large firms which obviously tend to be in short supply in
small countries.4 In addition, because the 1995-2010 time period is conveniently centred
around the 2003 NZX corporate governance reforms, we are able to provide some prelimi-
nary assessments of the impact of these initiatives. Perhaps most importantly, we identify
a number of unanswered questions and puzzles that may well serve as a useful agenda for
future NZ-based governance research. We do not, however, seek to answer any of these
questions, as each of them would be a separate project in itself. Our approach is, therefore,
almost exclusively descriptive.
In the next section, we describe our data and the 22 board characteristics that are
the focus of this paper. Section 3 begins by comparing the situation in 2010 with that of
1995: this allows us to see which board features have changed and which have not, and to
make some simple comparisons with other countries. We also illustrate and discuss trends
in selected variables over the entire sample period. In section 4, we (i) investigate whether
these trends differ according to firm size, (ii) compare the board characteristics of single-
listed NZX firms with those that also list on the Australian exchange, and (iii) determine
whether board characteristics have become more or less dispersed during our sample pe-
3An exception is Fox (1996) who describes the 1980-1993 evolution of NZ boards. However, his sample
period mainly pre-dates the resurgence of interest in governance matters and, moreover, he considers only
a very small number (four) of board characteristics – largely reflecting the data that were readily available
at that time.
4For example, the cross-country study of Aggarwal et al. (2007) based on Institutional Shareholder
Services includes only 18 NZ firms.
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riod. Finally, in section 5, we summarise the possible research questions uncovered by our
analysis and offer some concluding remarks.
2 Variables and Data
2.1 Variables
A full list (and accompanying description) of the variables analysed in this paper appears
in Table 1. In the rest of this section, we provide a brief discussion of the theory underlying,
and evidence associated with, each of these variables.
2.1.1 Board composition
Board with a greater number of directors can potentially call on a wider range of exper-
tise. However, large boards also have disadvantages: individual director responsibility is
weakened (a ‘safety-in-numbers’ effect), and greater difficulties in co-ordinating effective
discussion can lead to a dilution of decision-making power with consequent domination by
the CEO. Unsurprisingly, therefore, evidence on the importance of board size is mixed.
Yermack (1996), Guest (2009) and Mak and Kusndadi (2005) report a negative relation-
ship between board size and firm performance for US, UK and Asian firms respectively.
However, for US firms, Coles et al. (2007) find that the link depends on firm type – the re-
lationship is negative for single-product firms, but positive for more complex firms (which
presumably have greater need of wider expertise). In NZ, Chin et al. (2004) and Reddy et
al. (2010) report no relationship between firm size and board performance; Andjelkovic et
al. (2002) and Hurst and Vos (2007) similarly find no link between board size and CEO
remuneration.
By being less beholden to the CEO, non-executive and independent directors can
potentially enhance oversight and monitoring of firm activities (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
On the other hand, such directors are often less familiar with the industry in which their
firm operates. Consistent with these contrasting views, some authors (e.g., Byrd and
Hickman, 1992; Dann et al., 2003; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004) find that greater board
independence has a positive effect on various aspects of firm performance, while others
(e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Barnhart and Rosentein, 1998; Bhagat and Black, 2002)
find the reverse, at least for some firm types. In NZ, NZX Listing Rule 3.3.1 requires that
a minimum proportion of board directors be independent.5 Consistent with this view, NZ
5An independent director is one who is not an executive of the firm and who has no disqualifying
relationship. In practice, the latter requirement is generally interpreted to mean that an independent
director owns less than 5% of the firm’s shares and receives less than 10% of his annual income from the
firm. This is the definition we use for identifying independent directors in years before the NZX listing
rules required firms to list independent directors in their annual reports.
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Table 1: Definition of Variables
Description and definition of the variables analysed in this study.
Variable Name Variable Description
A. Board Composition
Board Size Total number of directors on the board
Non-Executive Directors Proportion of non-executive directors on the board
Independent Directors Proportion of independent directors on the board
Independent Majority Percentage of firms with a majority of independent directors
Female Director Incidence Percentage of firms with at least one female director
Female Director Representation Proportion of female directors on the board
Long-Serving Directors Proportion of firm directors with more than 5 years service
B. Director Remuneration
and Ownership
Chair Fees Fees (in 2010 dollars) paid to non-executive board chair
Director Fees Fees (in 2010 dollars, per director) paid to non-chair, non-executive directors
Director Ownership Proportion of equity shares beneficially owned by directors
C. Director Activity
Board Meetings Total number of board meetings held during the year
Total Meetings Total number of board and committee meetings held during the year
Total Directorships Average number of other directorships held by directors
Listed Directorships Average number of other NZX-listed directorships held by directors
D. Board Committees
Audit Committee Percentage of firms with a separate audit committee
Remuneration Committee Percentage of firms with a separate remuneration committee
Audit Committee Proportion of independent directors on audit committee
Independence
Remuneration Committee Proportion of independent directors on remuneration committee
Independence
E. CEO Board and Committee Involvement
CEO-Chair Percentage of firms where the board chair is also the CEO
CEO on Board Percentage of firms where the CEO sits on the board
CEO on Audit Committee Percentage of firms where the CEO is a member of the Audit
Committee
CEO on Remuneration Committee Percentage of firms where the CEO is a member of a separate
Remuneration Committee
CEO on Effective Remuneration Committee Percentage of firms where the CEO is either a member of a
separate Remuneration Committee or a member of the Board
if no Committee exists
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studies generally report a positive relationship between the percentage of outside and/or
independent directors and Tobin’s Q, e.g., Hossain et al. (2001), Reddy et al. (2008) and
Reddy et al. (2010).
Greater female representation on boards not only increases the size of the human
capital pool from which directors can be drawn, but also provides some additional skills
and perspectives that may not be possible with all-male boards. In recent years, both
Norway and France have imposed quotas for female representation. Providing some sup-
port for such actions, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that more gender-diverse boards
are tougher monitors. However, they also note that this attribute only seems to be valu-
able in firms with weak shareholder rights, and that the overall relationship between firm
performance and female representation on boards is negative. Although there appears to
be no NZ evidence on the effectiveness of female directors, there is a regular stream of
media comment suggesting that NZ firms are laggards when it comes to appointing female
directors.6 We measure female board representation in two ways: the percentage of firms
with at least one female director, and the proportion of female directors on each board.
Finally on board composition, long-serving directors bring experience and commit-
ment to the boardroom table, but also greater ‘familiarity’ with management that can
weaken oversight and monitoring. Vafeas (2003) reports results consistent with the latter
view, suggesting that lengthy board tenure is often associated with directors who befriend
management at the expense of shareholders. NZX Listing Rules 3.3.9 and 3.3.11 specify
a 5-year maximum term of appointment for executive directors and a 1/3 minimum of
directors to retire each year (although reappointment is allowed in both cases). We define
a long-serving director as one with more than five years continuous service on the board.
2.1.2 Director Remuneration and Ownership
Although typically only a tiny proportion of firm income, there is some evidence that
directors’ fees are positively linked to CEO remuneration (‘cronyism’) and that this has
an adverse impact on firm performance, e.g., Brick et al. (2006). An alternative mechanism
for incentivising and compensating directors is via director share ownership that directly
aligns directors’ interests with those of shareholders, although too great an ownership
share can put directors in conflict with small shareholders. Bhagat and Bolton (2010) and
Bhagat et al. (1999) both find a positive impact of director share ownership on US firm
performance as do, albeit somewhat less strongly, Farrer and Ramsay (1998) for Australian
firms.
NZ has no specific restrictions on director remuneration or share ownership, al-
though the NZX Best Practice Code recommends that directors take a portion of their
remuneration in the form of non-vested shares. We include only beneficially-owned shares
6See, for example, Radio NZ (2011).
5
in our measure of director ownership.
2.1.3 Director Activity
The most visible way in which directors fulfill their responsibilities is via attendance at
board and committee meetings. On the one hand, a greater number of meetings may
indicate more diligent boards; on the other it may simply reflect the substitution of form-
filling activities for true diligence. Interestingly, Vafeas (1999) reports that the annual
number of board meetings is negatively related to firm value, but also notes that this
result is driven by an increase in board activity following share price falls. Once this latter
effect is controlled for, Brick and Chidambaran (2010) find that firms holding more board
and committee meetings tend to have greater value.
Many directors hold directorships at more than one firm. While the holding of
multiple directorships can provide valuable experience and indicate high director quality, it
also raises the potential for workload problems that diminish overall effectiveness. Neither
Ferris et al. (2003) nor Sarkar and Sarkar (2009) find any evidence of shirking by ‘busy’
directors, but Fich and Shivdasani (2006) conclude that firms with a majority of busy
outside directors are weaker performers on average. We employ two measures of board
busyness: the number of other company directorships held by board members, and the
number of listed directorships.
2.1.4 Board Committees
The formation of board committees allows specialist oversight of sensitive areas. Authors
such as Anderson and Bizjak (2003), Bradbury et al. (2006), Brick and Chidambaran
(2010), Klein (2002) and Zhang et al. (2007) examine the importance of the audit and/or
remuneration committees for various firm activities. NZX Listing Rules 3.6.1 and 3.6.2
require NZ firms listed on the main board to have an audit committee containing a major-
ity of independent directors. The Best Practice Code contains similar recommendations
regarding remuneration committees. We investigate the extent of both audit and remu-
neration committee existence and independence in NZ firms.
2.1.5 CEO Involvement
The final characteristic we analyse is the involvement of CEOs in board and committee
activities. CEO participation in board discussions and decision-making can facilitate effec-
tive communication and motivate CEOs (e.g., Brickley et al., 1997; Muth and Donaldson,
1998), but may also be associated with significant agency problems (e.g., Bebchuck and
Fried, 2004; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Apparently persuaded by the latter view, the NZX
Best Practice Code recommends that the CEO should not fill the role of board chair, nor
sit on the audit committee. We document the extent of CEO involvement in the boards,
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and audit and remuneration committees, of NZ firms.
2.2 Data
The principal source of our data is the NZX Company Research annual reports collection.
We begin by identifying all NZX-listed firms for which an annual report is available in
1995 and then eliminate those firms which are not NZ-registered, or whose primary listing
exchange is in another country, or whose annual report contains no useful data. For
example, there are a total of 99 firm-reports available for 1995, but 13 of these are from
overseas firms and two others contain no useful data, leaving a total of 84 firms available
for analysis. For each of these firms, we collect all available data for the variables listed
in Table 1. We then repeat this exercise for each of 2000, 2007 and 2010. We use 1995
as our starting year as this is the first year in which the increased disclosure requirements
of the 1993 Companies Act began to take effect. Prior to that time, NZ company annual
reports often contained little information about board activities, so beginning our sample
period before 1995 would result in very small sample sizes for some variables.7
Where a firm is included in the sample but information on director identity, out-
side directorships, and tenure is not recorded in its annual reports, we turn to the NZ
Companies Office website.8 This contains a searchable archive of historical information
on directors and shareholders for all NZ-registered firms, thereby allowing us to fill some
of the gaps in the annual reports. However, because director information is available only
on an item-by-item basis – with many directors having a history of more than 100 di-
rectorships, each of which must be investigated individually to determine whether it is
a qualifying observation – obtaining useful information from this source is a somewhat
laborious process.9
Finally, to ensure comparability across time, we express all monetary values in 2010
NZ dollars. For this purpose, we adjust non-2010 values by the appropriate percentage
increase in the NZ consumer price index, obtained from the Reserve Bank of NZ website.10
Table 2 provides some summary information about our sample, which contains 84
firms for 1995, 100 for 2000, 134 for 2007, and 117 for 2010. Mean firm size is greater
in the earlier years, but median size is greater at the end of the sample period than the
beginning.11
7In addition, annual reports for a number of firms are not available for 1993 and 1994 in NZX Deep
Archive.
8See http://www.business.govt.nz/companies/
9For other variables, we were sometimes able to obtain additional information from the company’s
website.
10See http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/az/2989609.html
11The fall in mean and median company size between 2000 and 2007 primarily reflects two phenomena.
First, the delisting of large firms like Carter Holt Harvey and Lion Nathan during the period. Second, the
introduction of the NZX alternative board (NZAX) in 2003 which provided a greater incentive for smaller
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Table 2: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Summary descriptive statistics on sample and firm size. Small firms have total assets equal
to less than $50 million (in 2010 dollars); medium firms have total assets between $50 million
and $250 million; large firms have total assets greater than $250 million.
Variable All Small Medium Large
Number of Firms
1995 84 24 32 28
2000 100 21 38 41
2007 134 58 34 42
2010 117 43 37 37
Mean Firm Size (2010 $million)
1995 714.84 20.107 119.63 1990.6
2000 842.68 22.073 128.44 1925.0
2007 568.24 19.104 135.87 1676.6
2010 565.72 16.581 141.27 1628.4
Median Firm Size (2010 $million)
1995 97.138 16.798 94.840 765.19
2000 168.57 16.198 118.23 582.10
2007 95.148 17.122 133.91 694.04
2010 113.49 9.102 126.95 719.30
We also split our sample into three somewhat arbitrary size groups: small (total
assets less than $50 million in 2010 dollars), medium (total assets between $50 million and
$250 million), and large (total assets greater than $250 million). As can be seen in Table
2, these categories divide the total number of companies up roughly equally in each sample
year, although 1995 and 2000 have relatively large proportions of firms in the medium-size
group while small firms predominate in the latter years.
3 Principal Analysis and Results
To obtain an overall picture of what has occurred over the 16-year period, we begin by
focussing on the differences between the bookend years of 1995 and 2010; a subsequent
section examines trends revealed by the intermediate years. We assume our data for 1995
and 2010 provide representative samples of an underlying (hypothetical) population of NZ
firms during their respective years, thus allowing us to calculate some simple distributional
statistics for each of the variables appearing in Table 1. For the continuous variables, we
estimate means and medians and test for 1995–2010 differences using t- and Wilcoxon-
tests respectively. For binary variables, we report the percentage of firms having this
characteristic and test for 1995–2010 differences using a binomial z-test. In case these
firms to list their securities with NZX and thus be eligible for inclusion in our sample.
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simple statistics are a function of firm size, we also regress each board characteristic on a
sample-year dummy and total firm assets (in 2010 dollars), using OLS when the variable
of interest is continuous and Probit when it is binary. We also use these estimates to shed
some light on the similarities and differences between NZ boards and those from other
countries; for this purpose we focus on countries which also follow the Anglo-European
model of governance, primarily based on agency theory, e.g., Australia, the UK, and the
US. Our analysis of these inter-country differences is strictly informal: our data do not
allow us to test whether any observed differences are statistically significant, and we make
no attempt to explain such differences in terms of firm characteristics — a task well beyond
the scope of this paper. We do, however, identify the differences which seem to us most
worthy of further investigation.
3.1 Differences between 1995 and 2010
3.1.1 Board composition
Table 3 indicates that average board size fell from about 6.7 directors in 1995 to 5.9 in
2010, and that this decline is significant at the 1% level even after controlling for firm size.
At the same time, however, the representation of non-executive and independent directors
rose only a few percentage points, comprising approximately 80% and 60% respectively
of boards in 2010. Nevertheless, the percentage of boards with a majority of independent
directors increased by 16 percentage points (46% to 63%).12 Female representation on
boards also rose substantially: the percentage of boards with at least one female director
tripled during the 16-year period covered by our sample, as did the average proportion of
female directors per board (albeit to a still rather low 8%, with a median of zero). Director
tenure also saw a significant increase, with directors having more than five years service
being in the majority by 2010.
All of these trends are broadly in line with the experience of other countries –
internationally, boards have attempted to “do more with less” and place more emphasis
on board independence. For example, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) report similar
proportional changes in the size and independence of US boards between 1997 and 2003,
as do Simpson et al. (2010) for female representation. In the same vein, the data of
Kesner (1988) and Van Ness et al. (2010) imply a mean increase in US director tenure of
approximately 10% (7.2 years to 7.9 years).13
12Note, however, that prior to 2004 NZ firms were not required to distinguish between independent and
non-independent directors. Consequently, 1995 statistics are based on our own assessment of whether each
director met the (subsequently-introduced) NZX definition of director independence, and may therefore
be subject to error.
13Note, however, that the fall in average NZ board size may also be partly attributable to the greater
number of smaller firms choosing to list their equity on NZX’s alternative board after 2003 – see the results
for a continually-listed sub-sample of firms in section 3.2.
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Table 3: Board Composition
Comparison of 1995 and 2010 statistics for board composition. Variable definitions and
sample sizes appear in Table 1. Terms in parentheses underneath the variable names indicate
the sample sizes for 1995 and 2010 respectively. The t-test evaluates differences in sample
means; the W-(Wilcoxon) test evaluates differences in sample medians; the Binomial test
is based on a z-statistic and evaluates differences in sample proportions; the Size-adjusted
t-test extends the standard t and Binomial tests by controlling for firm size in OLS and
Probit regressions respectively. ∗∗∗(∗∗)(∗) denotes statistical significance at the 1% (5%)
(10%) level.
1995 2010
Mean or % Mean or % t-test Binomial Size-adjusted
Variable (Median) (Median) (W-test) test t-test
Board Size 6.656 5.872 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(84, 117) (6.000) (6.000) (∗∗)
Non-Executive Directors 0.790 0.834 ∗ ∗
(83, 117) (0.833) (0.833)
Independent Directors 0.556 0.627 ∗ ∗
(57, 115) (0.500) (0.625) (∗∗)
Independent Majority 45.6% 62.6% ∗∗ ∗
(57, 117)
Female Director Incidence 11.9% 34.2% ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(84, 117)
Female Director Representation 0.019 0.080 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(84, 117) (0.000) (0.000) (∗∗∗)
Long-Serving Directors 0.339 0.555 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(84, 117) (0.333) (0.600) (∗∗∗)
Turning to international differences in levels, evidence from the US (Chhaochharia
and Grinstein, 2007; Ning et al., 2010), UK (Guest, 2009), Singapore and Malaysia (Kus-
nadi, 2011), and Australia (Kang et al., 2007) indicates that board size is noticeably
smaller in NZ, but this almost certainly reflects the smaller size of NZ firms.14 More
interestingly, independent director representation in NZ differs from other countries in
a somewhat varying fashion. On the one hand, it is a little lower than in the US and
Australia: Chhaochharia and Grinstein estimate the mean representation of independent
directors on US boards in 2003 to be 71.4% while Kang et al. report that 83% of their
2003 sample of Australian firms have an independent director majority. On the other hand,
Kusnadi (2011) estimates that only 33% of directors on Singapore and Malaysia boards
during the 2000-05 period were independent. Turning to female representation, a simi-
lar pattern arises: our 2010 NZ estimates are somewhat lower than Adams and Ferreira
(2009) and Simpson et al. (2010) find for the US (8.9% for 1995-2003 and 11.9% in 2007
respectively) and Kang et al. (2007) report for Australia (10.37% in 2003), but somewhat
higher than the Francoeur et al. (2007) estimate of 7.02% for Canada in 2001-03.
14See, for example, Table 2 in Aggarwal et al. (2007).
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Table 4: Director Remuneration and Ownership
Comparison of 1995 and 2010 statistics for director remuneration and ownership. Variable
definitions and sample sizes appear in Table 1. Terms in parentheses underneath the vari-
able names indicate the sample sizes for 1995 and 2010 respectively. The t-test evaluates
differences in sample means; the W-(Wilcoxon) test evaluates differences in sample medians;
the Size-adjusted t-test extends the standard t-test by controlling for firm size in an OLS
regression. ∗∗∗(∗∗)(∗) denotes statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
1995 2010
Mean Mean t-test Size-adjusted
Variable (Median) (Median) (W-test) t-test
Chair Fees 49374 83592 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(30, 115) (42680) (67500) (∗∗∗)
Director Fees 25897 48787 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(32, 117) (23003) (39750) (∗∗∗)
Director Ownership 0.032 0.023
(66, 117) (0.005) (0.003)
3.1.2 Director Remuneration and Ownership
Table 4 reveals that per-person fees paid to board chairs and directors increased by more
than 60% in real terms between 1995 and 2010. By way of comparison, the corresponding
change in the all-sector Labour Cost Index over the same period was 1.5%. Clearly,
director remuneration increased at a much faster rate than overall wages and salaries.15
During the same period, director share ownership moved in the reverse direction,
with median board ownership per director equalling 0.5% of firm shares in 1995 and 0.3%
in 2010. Although the difference is statistically insignificant at conventional levels, this
change is nevertheless surprising given the NZX Best Practice Code recommendation for
share remuneration of directors.
Despite its rapid rise over the 16-year sample period, NZ director remuneration
remains fairly low compared to countries such as Australia (e.g., Henry, 2010) and the
US (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Cordeiro et al., 2000; Linn and Park, 2005), among
others, although much of this differential is likely to be due to the smaller average size of NZ
firms. Turning to director share ownership, the NZ figures are similar to those obtained for
Australia by Honeine and Swan (2010), but almost an order of magnitude higher than the
approximate 0.05% ownership stake reported by Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) and
Bhagat and Bolton (2010) for the the typical US director. Such a difference is unsurprising
given the much greater size and value of US firms.
15Nevertheless, chair and director fees have apparently grown more slowly than the remuneration of NZ
chief executive officers (CEO). Boyle and Roberts (2012, Table 1) report that the average annual increase
in nominal CEO remuneration between 1997 and 2005 was 11.34%, which corresponds to a real rise of
around 10% per annum. By contrast, from Table 4 the annual increase in real director fees was only 4.3%
per annum over our, slightly longer, sample period.
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Table 5: Director Activity
Comparison of 1995 and 2010 statistics for director remuneration and ownership. Variable
definitions and sample sizes appear in Table 1. Terms in parentheses underneath the vari-
able names indicate the sample sizes for 1995 and 2010 respectively. The t-test evaluates
differences in sample means; the W-(Wilcoxon) test evaluates differences in sample medians;
the Size-adjusted t-test extends the standard t-test by controlling for firm size in an OLS
regression. ∗∗∗(∗∗)(∗) denotes statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
1995 2010
Mean Mean t-test Size-adjusted
Variable (Median) (Median) (W-test) t-test
Board Meetings 11.03 10.87
(31, 80) (11.00) (10.00) (∗)
Total Meetings 13.68 15.05
(31, 80) (14.00) (13.50)
Total Directorships 8.822 7.644
(84, 117) (6.393) (6.250)
Listed Directorships 0.333 0.622 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(84, 117) (0.200) (0.316) (∗∗∗)
3.1.3 Director Activity
Apart from some weak evidence for a small decline in board meeting frequency, Table 5
reveals that internal board activity remained largely unchanged over the sample period:
board meetings take place approximately 11 times a year, supplemented by an additional
2-3 committee meetings. The number of board meetings is high compared to the 7-8
annual meetings reported by Al-Najjar (2012) and Brick and Chidambaran (2010) for UK
and US firms respectively.
Also unchanged over the sample period is the number of additional company di-
rectorships per director. By contrast, the average number of additional NZX-listed direc-
torships almost doubled over the same period. This implies an increasing concentration
of directors on the boards of listed NZ firms, consistent with our earlier observation on
long-serving directors, and may reflect difficulties in the recruitment of new directors due
to their increased liabilities under the 1993 Companies Act. Nevertheless, NZ directors do
not appear to be particularly ‘busy’ – the approximately 1.6 listed directorships held by
the average NZ director in 2010 is similar to the number held by their overseas counter-
parts: Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) and Ferris et al. (2003) find that the typical
US director holds fewer than two listed-firm directorships and Kiel and Nicholson (2006)
report a similar workload for Australian directors.
3.1.4 Board Committees
Table 6 shows the increased prominence of board committees in NZ firms. Given the
NZX requirement (introduced in 2003) that firms listing on the main board must have
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Table 6: Board Committees
Comparison of 1995 and 2010 statistics for board committee characteristics. Variable defi-
nitions and sample sizes appear in Table 1. Terms in parentheses underneath the variable
names indicate the sample sizes for 1995 and 2010 respectively. The t-test evaluates differ-
ences in sample means; the W-(Wilcoxon) test evaluates differences in sample medians; the
Binomial test is based on a z-statistic and evaluates differences in sample proportions; the
Size-adjusted t-test extends the standard t and Binomial tests by controlling for firm size
in OLS and Probit regressions respectively. ∗∗∗(∗∗)(∗) denotes statistical significance at the
1% (5%) (10%) level.
1995 2010
Mean or % Mean or % t-test Binomial Size-adjusted
Variable (Median) (Median) (W-test) test t-test
Audit Committee 58.3% 95.7% ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(84, 117)
Remuneration Committee 33.3% 79.3% ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
(84, 116)
Audit Committee 0.674 0.809 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Independence (0.667) (0.750) (∗∗∗)
(49, 109)
Remuneration Committee 0.721 0.764
Independence (0.667) (0.750)
(28, 88)
a separate audit committee, it is unsurprising that the percentage of firms with such a
committee rose from 58.3 in 1995 to 95.7 in 2010. Audit committees have also become
increasingly dominated by independent directors, their representation rising from 67.4%
on average in 1995 to 80.9% in 2010. In this context, interestingly, the NZX listing rules
specify only that the audit committee contain a simple majority of independent directors,
so NZ firms appear to have voluntarily adopted structures over and above requirements.16
Similarly, even without the impetus of a listing rule, the percentage of firms employing
a separate remuneration committee more than doubled – from 33.3 to 79.3 – during the
sample period, although independent director representation on these committees rose
only slightly in the average firm.
These figures fall somewhat below those in the usual comparator countries. For
example, Henry (2010) finds that, as of 2002, 99% of Australian listed firms had a separate
audit committee and 88% a separate remuneration committee. For the US, Chhaochharia
and Grinstein (2007) report that 100% of listed firms had a separate audit committee in
2003, with 99% also having a separate remuneration committee. Neither study provides
details on independent director representation on these committees, but Chhaochharia
and Grinstein note that 76.8% of US firms had audit committees comprised entirely of
16Bradbury et al. (2006) report evidence suggesting that audit committees are effective only when all
members are independent directors.
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Table 7: CEO Board and Committee Involvement
Comparison of 1995 and 2010 statistics for CEO involvement on the board of directors.
Variable definitions and sample sizes appear in Table 1. The Binomial test is based on a
z-statistic and evaluates differences in sample proportions; the Size-adjusted t-test extends
the Binomial test by controlling for firm size in a Probit regression. Terms in parentheses
underneath the variable names indicate the sample sizes for 1995 and 2010 respectively.
1995 2010
Binomial Size-adjusted
Variable % % test t-test
CEO-Chair 1.2% 0.0%
(84, 117)
CEO on Board 67.9% 66.7%
(84, 117)
CEO on Audit Committee 10.4% 7.4%
(48, 108)
CEO on Remuneration Committee 3.5% 10.1%
(28, 89)
CEO on Effective Remuneration 41.6% 20.5% ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Committee (84, 117)
independent directors in 2003. So even if none of the remaining boards had an independent
majority the overall independent director representation would still be in the vicinity of
85-90% – considerably higher than the corresponding NZ figure of 79%.
3.1.5 CEO Board and Committee Involvement
In their discussion of international governance trends, LeBlanc and Gillies (2005, p.92)
claim that:
It is almost unheard of for the chief executive officer of the corporation not to
be a member of the board of directors. Indeed, in many companies, particularly
in the United States, it is not unusual for the role of the board and CEO to
be combined.
Neither part of this statement holds in NZ. As Table 7 shows, virtually no NZ CEO also
held the position of board chair in either 1995 or 2010. By contrast, Bhagat and Bolton
(2010), Brick and Chidambaran (2010), and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) all report
60-70% of US firms as having combined CEO-Chair roles in the 2000s, while Henry (2010)
finds a corresponding range of 21-25% in Australia during the same period.17 Similarly,
far from being “almost unheard of”, approximately 1/3 of NZ CEOs do not sit on their
company’s board.
At the other end of the spectrum, CEO membership of the remuneration committee
is relatively common in NZ firms, with 10.1% having this characteristic in 2010. Moreover,
17Kusnadi (2011) reports that 18% of CEOs in Singapore and Malaysia also serve as board chairmen.
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after taking into account CEOs who sit on the boards of firms that do not have a remu-
neration committee, and who are thus effectively members of those firms’ remuneration
committees, this figure rises to over 20%. By contrast, Vafeas (2003) reports that only two
of the 271 largest firms in the Forbes compensation survey for 1997 fall into this category.
Similarly, Anderson and Bizjak (2003, p.1325) note that by 1998 insiders “are essentially
absent” from a random sample of 110 New York Stock Exchange firms.
3.2 Sub-Sample of Continually-Listed Firms
An obvious question to ask about the above results is whether they primarily reflect
changes in standard governance practice by the typical NZ firm (as we have implicitly
assumed) or changes in sample composition as companies list and de-list.18 To address
this issue, we repeat the above analysis for the sub-sample of 24 firms that remained listed
throughout the sample period.
Because the results from doing so are very similar to those appearing in Tables
3 – 7, we do not report them in any detail, but simply summarize their principal fea-
tures. For the continually-listed sub-sample, similar or slightly bigger changes (in ab-
solute value terms) occurred in the representation of non-executive, independent, female
and long-serving directors, in chair and director fees, in the number of board meetings and
additional listed-firm directorships, in the adoption of separate audit and remuneration
committees, and in the propensity of the CEO to take on chair, board and remuneration
committee roles. Slightly smaller changes arose in board size and audit committee in-
dependence. Only in CEO membership of the audit committee was there any noticeable
difference between the full and continually-listed samples: whereas in the full sample 10.4%
of CEOs had this function in 1995, falling to 7.4% in 2010, the corresponding numbers in
the continually-listed sample are 16.7% and 20.8%. Long-surviving firms thus appear to
have been considerably more likely to appoint their CEO to the audit committee, a ten-
dency that slightly increased over the sample period. Nevertheless, the general impression
obtained from this exercise is that the results in section 3.1 do indeed reflect fundamental
changes in across-the-board governance choices rather than changes in sample composition.
3.3 1995–2010 Trends in Board Characteristics
We now investigate the extent to which the observed differences (or non-differences, as
the case may be) between 1995 and 2010 reflect consistent trends throughout the sample
period. In order not to overload the reader, we focus on ten fundamental characteristics
that we view as being the most important and/or interesting.
Figure 1 displays the results of this exercise. The level of chair and director fees,
18One reason why this might be important is the increased listing of smaller firms after 2003.
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Figure 1: 1995–2010 Trends in Board Composition, Activity, and Incentives: All Firms
Combined.
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the representation of independent and female directors, the holding of additional listed-
firm directorships, and the existence of audit and remuneration committees all increased
monotonically over the period. Somewhat surprisingly however, very little of the increases
in committee existence and independent director representation occurred between 2000
and 2007, despite this being the period spanning the introduction of NZX rules and rec-
ommendations regarding these characteristics. In the cases of the audit and remuneration
committees, for example, by far the greatest rate of formation occurred prior to 2000,
suggesting that the NZX initiatives were simply formalizing phenomena that were already
occurring naturally. By contrast, the biggest increases in chair and director fees took
place during the 2000–2007 period. Although this timing is probably coincidental, it is,
nevertheless, a somewhat unexpected response to a greater official focus on governance
matters.
Somewhat better news for the effectiveness of the NZX governance reforms is sug-
gested by a considerably reduced presence of CEOs on the audit and (effective) remu-
neration committees. Only half as many CEOs were directly engaged in remuneration
decisions at the end of the sample period as at the beginning, with most of this fall oc-
curring between 2000 and 2007. And while the overall drop in CEO presence on the audit
committee was nowhere near as great, almost all of it occurred between 2000 and 2007.
Board size also trended downwards during the 1995-2007 period, before rebounding
somewhat in 2010. Whether this represents the beginning of a return to the past or is
simply a statistical blip remains to be seen. This minor exception aside, Figure 1 suggests
that section 3.1’s formal comparison of beginning- and end-date values robustly captures
trends that were in operation over the entire period covered by our analysis.
4 Other Issues
4.1 Board Trends and Firm Size
The results presented thus far ignore possible firm size-based variation in board charac-
teristics. To address this issue, we first place each firm-year in our sample in one of the
three size categories described in section 2.2 and then re-estimate means (or percentages)
in each of these categories for the set of board characteristics appearing in Figure 1.
Figure 2 summarizes the results. Most board characteristics follow similar paths
regardless of firm size. In all three size categories; (i) female and independent director
representation rose, (ii) the existence of audit and remuneration committees became more
common, and (iii) the presence of CEOs on the latter became less common. Moreover,
board size drifted gently downwards in two of the the three size categories, while remaining
essentially stationary in the third.
Despite this apparent homogeneity, there are also some interesting differences. First,
17
Board Size
2
4
6
8
10
1995 2000 2007 2010
Small Medium Large
Independent Directors
0.45
0.55
0.65
1995 2000 2007 2010
Small Medium Large
Female Director Representa6on
0
0.03
0.06
0.09
0.12
1995 2000 2007 2010
Small Medium Large
Listed Directorships
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1995 2000 2007 2010
Small Medium Large
Chair Fees
10000
60000
110000
160000
1995 2000 2007 2010
Small Medium Large
Director Fees
5000
30000
55000
80000
1995 2000 2007 2010
Small Medium Large
Audit Commi<ee
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1995 2000 2007 2010
Small Medium Large
Remunera6on Commi<ee
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
1995 2000 2007 2010
Small Medium Large
CEO on Effec6ve Remunera6on 
Commi<ee
15%
25%
35%
45%
1995 2000 2007 2010
Small Medium Large
CEO on Audit Commi<ee
0%
10%
20%
30%
1995 2000 2007 2010
Small Medium Large
Figure 2: 1995–2010 Trends in Board Composition, Activity, and Incentives: Firm Size
Groups. Small firms have total assets equal to less than $50 million (in 2010 dollars); medium-size firms
have total assets between $50 million and $250 million; large firms have total assets greater than $250
million.
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the graphs for chair and director fees are revealing in that not only are fees considerably
higher in large firms, but they also increased at a much faster rate than those of the other
two size groups (particularly compared to the smallest firms). Clearly, the rewards for
accepting large firm directorships rose significantly in both absolute and relative terms.
Second, the medium-size group sometimes stands out from the other two. For example,
while this group had the lowest rate of female director representation in 1995, it had easily
the highest by 2010. A similar pattern applies to the holding of listed directorships. Going
in precisely the reverse direction, the medium-size group also had the highest proportion
of independent directors in 1995 but this barely changed over the sample period resulting
in it having the lowest proportion by 2010.
4.2 Cross-listing effects
In section 3.1 above, we noted some differences between NZ board characteristics and those
from other (mainly much larger) countries. This raises an important question: do such
differences primarily reflect something unique about NZ firms, or about the NZ governance
environment? To provide some preliminary evidence on this issue, we compare the board
characteristics of NZ firms listed only on the NZX with those of firms that also list on the
(much larger) Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). The governance choices of such firms will
be influenced by the Australian governance environment, so by comparing these choices
with those of their NZX-only counterparts we can gauge the extent to which NZ board
characteristics reflect the NZ governance environment. Because the ASX-listed group are
typically amongst the largest NZ firms, we eschew comparison of board variables that have
an obvious connection with firm size (e.g., board size, chair and director fees) in order to
focus as closely as possible on ‘pure’ cross-listing effects.19
Table 8 shows that differences between the two groups of firms exist primarily at the
committee level. Although dual-listed firms have more independent directors, fewer busy
and long-serving directors, a slightly smaller number of board meetings, and are more likely
to have at least one female director and a CEO who sits on the board, these differences
are mainly small and statistically insignificant. By contrast, the greater propensities of
dual-listed firms to have (i) a formal remuneration committee and (ii) greater independent
director representation on the audit and remuneration committees are more economically
and statistically important. Overall, however, the board choices of NZ firms do not seem
to be greatly altered by listing in another jurisdiction.
19We also do not consider variables where there is very little full-sample variation, e.g., CEO-Chair.
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Table 8: Cross-Country Differences in Board Characteristics: NZX-listed versus
NZX/ASX-listed firms
Comparison of 2010 board characteristics between NZ firms listed solely on the NZX and
those jointly listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). Variable definitions appear in
Table 1. Terms in parentheses next to the variable names indicate the sample sizes for NZX-
listed and joint-listed firms respectively. The t-test evaluates differences in sample means;
the Binomial test is based on a z-statistic and evaluates differences in sample proportions.
∗∗∗(∗∗)(∗) denotes statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
NZX only NZX and ASX
Variable Mean or % Mean or % t-test Binomial test
Non-Executive Directors (101, 16) 0.830 0.858
Independent Directors (99, 16) 0.615 0.704
Independent Majority (99, 16) 60.6% 75.0%
Female Director Incidence (101, 16) 31.7% 50.0%
Female Director Representation (101, 16) 0.081 0.067
Long-Serving Directors (101, 16) 0.562 0.512
Board Meetings (67, 13) 10.99 10.31
Listed Directorships (101, 16) 0.657 0.403 ∗
Remuneration Committee (100, 16) 77.0% 93.8% ∗∗
Audit Committee 0.788 0.894 ∗∗
Independence (93, 16)
Remuneration Committee 0.719 0.883 ∗∗∗
Independence (73, 15)
CEO on Board (101, 16) 64.4% 81.3%
CEO on Audit Committee (92, 16) 8.70% 0.00% ∗∗∗
CEO on Effective Remuneration 22.8% 6.3% ∗∗
Committee (101, 16)
Table 9: Convergence of Board Characteristics
Comparison of 1995 and 2010 standard deviations for various board characteristics. Variable
definitions and sample sizes appear in Table 1. Differences are evaluated using an F-test.
∗∗∗(∗∗)(∗) denotes statistical significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
1995 2010
Variable Standard deviation Standard deviation F-test
Board Size 1.978 1.643 ∗
Non-executive Directors 0.208 0.155 ∗∗∗
Independent Directors 0.191 0.213
Audit Committee Independence 0.271 0.203 ∗∗
Remuneration Committee Independence 0.266 0.299
log of Chair Fees 0.672 0.723
log of Director Fees 0.709 0.726
Director Ownership 0.052 0.043 ∗
Long Serving Directors 0.303 0.306
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4.3 Convergence of Board Characteristics
The adoption of very similar corporate governance codes by so many countries around the
world in the last 20 years suggests the development of an international consensus on best-
practice governance, and consequently on optimal board characteristics. To the extent
this is true, we would expect to see evidence of convergence in board characteristics.
For example, the increasing importance placed on director independence implies that
fewer boards and board committees will contain a minority of independent directors, thus
reducing the dispersion in the extent to which independent directors are represented.
To examine this issue in the NZ context, we estimate standard deviations (as a proxy
for dispersion) for most of the continuous variables in our sample and test for differences
between 1995 and 2010.20 The results of this exercise appear in Table 9. Dispersion in
the number of directors per board, the board representation of non-executive directors,
and the extent of audit committee independence fell significantly between 1995 and 2010,
consistent with firms moving towards an agreed ‘best-practice’ model of governance. In
other areas, however, there is little or no sign of convergence: director share ownership
and independent director representation on both the remuneration committee and the
full board actually saw a slight rise in dispersion during the period. Nor, after adjusting
for their significant increases in mean, was there any reduction in chair and director fee
dispersion.21
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
Our principal findings in this paper are as follows:
I. Between 1995 and 2010, the average board size of NZ firms fell slightly, while the
board representation of non-executive, independent, long-serving and female directors
all rose, as did the propensity of firms to establish separate audit and remuneration
committees. Real chair and director fees rose sharply, especially in large firms. The
typical director also took on more listed directorships.
II. The 2003 NZX corporate governance reforms appear to have had relatively little
impact on the governance choices of NZ firms: most of the substantial changes in
board characteristic statistics had occurred by 2000, there is only weak evidence
for convergence in board characteristics over the sample period, and director share
20As well as eliminating the binary variables from this exercise (since standard deviations would shed
little light on convergence for such variables), we also exclude variables that were close to zero in 1995,
e.g., female representation.
21The adjustment consists of taking the natural log of the two fees variables before estimating their
standard deviations, which is approximately equivalent to estimating the coefficient of variation of the
unlogged variables.
21
ownership declined. One exception is CEO involvement in audit and remuneration
committee decisions, the frequency of which does seem to have fallen in recent years.
III. NZ board characteristics sometimes differ quite markedly from those prevailing abroad,
particularly in the adoption of separate audit and remuneration committees, in the
formal involvement of CEOs with these committees and with the board itself, in the
frequency of board meetings, and in the representation of independent directors.
In turn, these findings suggest a number of unanswered questions about NZ boards:
(i) Why do so many NZ CEOs – approximately 1/3 in 2010 – not sit on their firm’s
board? And does this have consequences for intra-firm communication, strategy and
performance?
(ii) Why do so few NZ CEOs serve as board chair? Is this an appropriate local response
to a potential agency problem?
(iii) Relative to the typical situation overseas, a significant proportion of NZ CEOs effec-
tively sit on their firm’s remuneration committee. Is this, as would appear at first
glance, a major conflict of interest, or is it an optimal response to local conditions?
(iv) Why is the representation of independent directors on NZ boards (and associated
committees) still somewhat lower than in other countries? Is there evidence that
this hinders firm performance?
(v) Why do NZ boards tend to hold more meetings than their overseas counterparts? Is
this an indicator of greater diligence or greater inefficiency?
(vi) Although the holding of listed directorships appears to conform with international
norms, many NZ directors also tend to hold a significant number of unlisted direc-
torships. Does this dilute their effectiveness on the boards of listed firms?
(vii) How and why have NZ chair and director fees risen so markedly over the 15-year
period of our study? Does this primarily reflect rent expropriation by boards, or
increasing international competition for director talent, or compensation for increased
risks and responsibilities?
We hope that at least some of these questions thrown up by our data will motivate further
research on NZ corporate boards.
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